Iran Court Sentences 10 Protesters to Death in Isfahan

A Revolutionary Court in Isfahan has sentenced 10 protesters to death and six others to prison terms of up to 25 years in connection with nationwide demonstrations in the central Iranian city. The convictions stem from protests that occurred in the Shohada Square area during the January uprising, a case now widely known as the “Isfahan Shohada Square” case. Among those sentenced to prison, Romina Rahimi and Milad Boeri each received 25-year terms. Additionally, Setayesh Saedi, Sajjad Abedi, and Ali Boeri were each handed five-year prison sentences by the court. No further details were immediately available regarding the specific charges leading to these severe penalties.

Isfahan Verdict Details

Branch 1 of the Isfahan Revolutionary Court issued the initial verdicts against 16 individuals detained in connection with the protests that began in late December 2025. Those sentenced to death include Taraneh Rahimi, Navid Elyasi, Mehrdad Boeri, Abolfazl Dadgostar, Armin Gholami, Mehdi Mansouri, Ahmadreza Saeedi, Mohammadmehdi Asadi, Parsa Jafari, and Mehdi Jafari, also known as Mehdi Khosravi. Hamed Mehralian received a 15-year prison term. All 16 defendants were also sentenced to five years for “assembly and collusion,” an additional five years for “incitement,” and one year for “propaganda against the establishment.” These additional sentences highlight the broad legal framework used by the Iranian judiciary to suppress dissent, often combining multiple charges for a single act of protest. The cumulative nature of these sentences can lead to lengthy prison terms even for those not facing the death penalty.

The 16 defendants primarily worked around Shohada Street in Isfahan. The case has become known as the “Isfahan Shohada Square” case, specifically referencing the location of the protests that led to these arrests and subsequent convictions. The convictions stem from protests that occurred in the Shohada Square area during the January uprising. The case was connected to the deaths of Abbas Kamrani, a 37-year-old Revolutionary Guards colonel, and another person described in case documents as “homeless.” The court proceedings have been criticized by human rights organizations, which frequently point to a lack of due process in such cases.

One female defendant was reportedly assaulted in detention and filed a complaint over the incident, but the court delivered its verdict without examining the claim. This raises significant concerns about the treatment of detainees and the judicial process. Ahmadreza Saeedi, one of those sentenced to death, informed judges during his trial that he had been tortured during interrogation. There had previously been reports of restrictions on lawyers' access to case files and of defendants being tortured to extract confessions, suggesting a pattern of abuses within the judicial system. These allegations of torture and lack of investigation into assault complaints show the challenges faced by defendants in Iran's Revolutionary Courts. (Aug 30, 2026, 18:09 GMT+1)

Broader Context of Legal Actions and Financial Crimes

Separately, Iran’s Fars News cited unconfirmed reports of an explosion at Al Udeid Air Base in Qatar. Domestically, Iranian police arrested a person accused of owing the country’s banking system more than €300 million after receiving foreign currency generated by exports. Police identified the detainee only by the initials “A.L.” and described the person as one of the leaders of a network of financial intermediaries, known in Iran as “trustees,” used to transfer export revenues outside the formal banking system. The suspect had received foreign currency proceeds from exports over several years but failed to meet obligations to the banking system. The individual had gone on the run before being located and arrested by economic security police and sent to prison. Majidreza Hariri of the Iran-China Chamber of Commerce stated on X that the detainee had served as secretary of the Iranian Association of Money Changers. Iran’s central bank dissolved the Association of Money Changers in 2023, signaling a crackdown on informal financial networks.

The judiciary had opened 59 cases involving managers of trustee companies and issued prosecution orders in 43 of them. Zabihollah Khodaeian, a judiciary spokesman, told state broadcaster IRIB in July that some trustees had “betrayed” the country and that one intermediary had failed to return $200 million before leaving Iran. It was claimed that at least 15 trustees had become unreachable while holding billions of dollars in Iranian oil revenues. Authorities were also seeking Interpol Red Notices for 15 trustees who had fled the country, indicating the scale of the financial irregularities. Relatives of some of Iran’s most powerful security figures, including the son of Mohsen Rezaei, were among nine people linked to an oil-sales network that sources said failed to return about $11 billion in proceeds to Iran, noting potential high-level corruption. (Aug 30, 2026, 16:06 GMT+1)

Broader Protest Crackdown

The protests began with strikes by shopkeepers in Tehran before spreading rapidly to surrounding cities and much of Tehran province. Demonstrations peaked on January 8 and 9 following a call by exiled Prince Reza Pahlavi. The swift spread of the protests across various urban centers indicated widespread discontent.

A Revolutionary Guards veteran who fought in Syria helped command a deadly crackdown on protesters in Shahriar near Tehran. Witnesses and local sources identified Abbas Rasoulifar, a former Guards member with experience fighting alongside forces supporting Bashar al-Assad in Syria, as directing operational groups deployed against protesters in Shahriar. This suggests the application of tactics learned in foreign conflicts to domestic suppression. In Shahriar, the vicinity of the Imamzadeh Esmail shrine emerged as a center for assembling and dispatching forces, indicating the strategic use of religious sites as operational bases. Rasoulifar, the shrine's executive director, commanded operational groups during the January crackdown and personally fired a handgun at protesters, illustrating direct involvement of military personnel in violent suppression.

Rasoulifar was born in 1963, joined the Basij in 1979, and the Revolutionary Guards in 1984, reflecting a long career within Iran's security apparatus. Javan newspaper documented Rasoulifar's presence in Syria in 2017, confirming his experience in foreign conflict zones. His name surfaced in connection with earlier domestic crackdowns, including in 2009 and the November 2019 protests in Shahriar, establishing a history of involvement in suppressing dissent. Witnesses accused him of involvement in the killing of protester Nader Momeni in Shahriar in 2019, further detailing his alleged role in past violence.

In Eslamshahr, police and riot-control forces went on alert in Zarafshan and Bagh-e Feyz on January 7 as strikes began, indicating a preemptive response to anticipated unrest. In Vavan, near Eslamshahr, witnesses said live ammunition was fired that night from the roof of a mosque and around Khomeini Square, demonstrating the use of elevated positions and residential areas for targeting protesters.

Tactics and Wider Violence

In Parand, located in Robat Karim county, witnesses reported that armed personnel speaking Arabic fired directly at protesters from inside mosques and bases on January 8. The use of personnel speaking Arabic and firing from within religious or military facilities raises questions about the identity and origin of the forces deployed. Security forces in Pakdasht deployed a large armored vehicle and firearms against demonstrators around Mamazand and Allameh Street on the same day, showcasing the deployment of heavy equipment in urban areas. In Gharchak, the electricity around Kalantari Square was cut on the evening of January 8 before shooting began from inside a police station, a tactic often used to disorient and control crowds. Snipers positioned on the roof and different floors of a restaurant in Khomeini Square also fired at protesters in the darkness, maximizing their advantage in low-light conditions. Local sources indicated that dozens of people were killed in Gharchak during these events, showing the severity of the crackdown.

In Varamin, on January 9, vehicles equipped with loudspeakers played religious chants at high volume as security forces fired tear gas and live ammunition. This combination of psychological warfare with direct force aimed to intimidate and disperse protesters. Shahr-e Qods experienced severe internet disruption and a power outage on January 8, limiting communication and organization among demonstrators. Witnesses there reported that snipers positioned on the roof of the Milad commercial complex and armed groups fired at protesters on January 8 and 9, demonstrating coordinated and lethal force. Local accounts indicated that dozens were killed in Shahr-e Qods, noting the high casualty rate in this area. Ilya Qodsi was fatally shot in the head in Shahr-e Qods, a specific example of the lethal force used.

Mohammadreza Moradgholi, a 19-year-old protester, was detained on the evening of January 8 and subsequently killed by security forces who cut a blood vessel, suggesting brutal treatment in custody. On January 9, security forces searched a young man's phone near the Pardis toll station, detained him after finding a photograph of Pahlavi, severely beat him, and forced him to swallow two pills, illustrating the extreme measures taken to identify and punish supporters of the opposition.

Context and International Reaction

In the separate Alikhani Square case, Iranian authorities have executed five defendants since July. Ghaem Hosseini was executed on August 20. Abolfazl Sepahi Badjani and Amirhossein Safari Hosseinabadi were executed on July 28, with their executions carried out publicly in Alikhani Square, serving as a public deterrent. Golmohammad Mohammadi and Erfan Esfandiari were executed on July 19. These executions in a separate case show a broader pattern of severe judicial responses to protests.

Recurring features across cities included the use of rooftops for gunfire, power cuts, and live ammunition. These tactics suggest a coordinated and systematic approach to suppressing dissent. Similarities with urban warfare methods used in Syria were identified, such as dividing cities into operational sectors and assigning units responsibility for controlling designated areas. These parallels raise concerns about the transfer of military tactics from foreign conflicts to domestic law enforcement, potentially escalating the lethality of crackdowns. (Aug 30, 2026, 23:25 GMT+1)